The round trip you are paying for
Somebody else operates the estate. You know what to run; they can reach it. So the work goes back and forth as instructions in a chat window and screenshots of output, and the record of what ran is whatever somebody remembered to paste.
What you get back
Each run is captured as it was produced and kept that way. Afterwards there is a record of what ran, where, and what came back, searchable and exportable, which is the thing you are buying.
Why they will let you
The protocol, the CLI and the station are public, and a station on a customer's machine runs code that customer can read. Payload content is end-to-end encrypted and moves only through published components. The proprietary broker handles account, topology and authorisation metadata and can permit, deny or route a connection; it takes no part in the fingerprint comparison that pairs two ends, which happens out of band between two people.
What is true today, with its condition
- A station verifies against a signed trusted set and publishes that set, so a key nobody authorised is detectable. Detectable rather than prevented, and on a beacon revocation is eventual.
- The longest a revoked authorisation can still work is 15 minutes, proved by a test that revokes and then steps a clock.
- Both relay implementations build reproducibly, and a stranger can rebuild the published hash themselves. Nothing is signed yet, and no deployed hash has been compared against a build.
Try it
If there is an estate you cannot reach, read the source, then try it against one machine.